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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2165 
___________ 
 
ESHED ALSTON,  
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OF DELAWARE COURTS; SUPERIOR COURT; 
SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE; COURT ON THE JUDICIARY; 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE; STATE HUMAN RELATIONS 
COMMISSION; and JUDGE VAUGHN, in his official capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civ. No. 1:15-cv-01112) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 18, 2016 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 6, 2016)        
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PER CURIAM 
 EShed Alston appeals from an order of the District Court granting motions to 
dismiss his civil rights complaint and denying Alston’s motion for recusal.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will summarily affirm because the appeal 
presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.  We may affirm on any ground 
supported by the record.  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 Alston’s complaint is a loose collection of political beliefs, invective and 
commentary on current events, and the claims raised therein are hard to discern.  As best 
we can tell, Alston’s primary claim is that he was barred from the facilities at Delaware 
State University (“DSU”), improperly so, allegedly in disregard of both (1) DSU’s status 
as a historically Black land-grant institution; and (2) Alston’s status as a DSU alumnus 
and a descendant of Delaware slaves.  Without access to DSU, Alston has allegedly been 
unable to create a working prototype of a “solar hydro system” similar to that developed 
by California-based Solyndra using, says Alston, his misappropriated intellectual 
property.  See In re: Solyndra LLC, Bankr. No. 11-12799, ECF No. 1167 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Oct. 17, 2012) (Alston’s “emergency” petition alleging “copyright infringement”).  
Named as defendants in the complaint were the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware (“USBCDD”), as well as James T. Vaughn (Associate Justice of the Delaware 
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Supreme Court, in his “official capacity”) and a handful of Delaware government entities 
(collectively, “State Defendants”) that have allegedly failed to respond to Alston’s 
various complaints of widespread racial discrimination.             
 Alston’s complaint was originally filed in the Superior Court of Delaware (Kent 
County), but was removed to federal court in Wilmington pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1442(a)(1).  The case was assigned to the Honorable Sue L. Robinson, U.S.D.J.  
Following removal, the USBCDD and the State Defendants each filed a motion to 
dismiss Alston’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), based on sovereign immunity.  
Alternatively, the defendants sought dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Alston opposed the motions, and filed a motion seeking recusal of 
Judge Robinson based on his perception that she could not be an impartial adjudicator in 
light of her adverse rulings in Alston’s prior federal actions. 
 The District Court denied Alston’s motion for recusal.  It determined that Alston 
failed to present “a basis from which to conclude that the court has a personal bias or 
prejudice against plaintiff or in favor of any defendant.”  The District Court reasoned that 
its rejection of previous suits filed by Alston (or in which he informally participated) 
“were based on legal precedent rather than bias, prejudice or animus,” and thus provided 
“an insufficient basis for recusal.”  Turning to the motions to dismiss, the District Court 
determined that the USBCDD and the Stated Defendants were all immune from suit.  The 
District Court proceeded to also determine that Alston failed to state a claim for relief 
 4 
 
against any defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court granted the motions to 
dismiss, without leave to amend, and entered judgment against Alston.  He appealed. 
 We have considered Alston’s filings in this Court, including his prematurely filed 
pro se brief, and have concluded that this appeal presents no substantial question.  In 
particular, Alston offered no legitimate basis for recusal of Judge Robinson, and his 
motion seeking such relief was thus properly denied.  Alston’s motion relied primarily on 
a series of adverse rulings in cases over which Judge Robinson presided, but “judicial 
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”  Liteky 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  And while Alston has expressed displeasure 
that his federal actions are typically assigned to Judge Robinson, we have previously 
observed that 28 U.S.C. § 137 does not provide litigants with “a right to have [their] case 
heard by a particular judge,” a “right to any particular procedure for the selection of the 
judge,” or a “right to have the judge selected by a random draw.” A.S. ex rel. Miller v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 769 F.3d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).   
 Furthermore, the District Court properly granted both of the motions to dismiss 
Alston’s complaint, on the basis of sovereign immunity.  The USBCDD is part of the 
judicial branch of the Federal Government and, “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity 
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”  FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 475 (1994).  As for the State Defendants, they, too, enjoy absolute immunity from 
suit.  See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 
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144 (1993) (“Absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may ‘be 
subject to suit in federal court’” under the Eleventh Amendment) (citation omitted); Will 
v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (suit against state official in his 
official capacity is no different from a suit against the state itself); Robinson v. Danberg, 
729 F. Supp. 2d 666, 675 (D. Del. 2010) (“The State of Delaware has not waived its 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”).1  Pertinent to Alston’s apparent 
cause of action, we recognize that Congress did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Will, 491 U.S. at 66. 
 Normally, leave to amend should be granted sua sponte before a district court 
dismisses a pro se civil rights action, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.  
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  We find no error or 
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s refusal to grant leave to amend, as it properly 
determined that amendment would be futile given the defendants’ immunity defenses. 
 Accordingly, for the reasons provided above, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.  Alston’s pending motions, including his motions seeking “transfer” of his 
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, are denied. 
                                              
1 We note that Alston did not explicitly sue Justice Vaughn in his individual capacity, nor 
did he provide any facts in his complaint by which we could reasonably infer an 
individual-capacity theory.  Cf. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991).  In any event, 
insofar as Alston’s complaint challenged conduct done by Justice Vaughn in his role as a 
jurist, Justice Vaughn would be entitled to absolute judicial immunity.  See Mireles v. 
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).  
